This paper investigates whether the central bank of Taiwan would have had a more successful monetary policy during the period 1971:1 to 1997:4 if it had followed an optimal rule rather than the discretionary policies that were actually employed. The paper examines the use of two different instruments-the discount rate and the monetary base-with several different targetsgrowth of nominal output, inflation, the exchange rate, and the money growth. The results show that most of the rules considered would not have significantly improved the performance of the Taiwanese economy. The only rule that is clearly advantageous is one that targets inflation while using the interest rate instrument.
Introduction
How well has the Central Bank of Taiwan implemented monetary policy during the past three decades? With the exception of two inflationary episodes during periods of oil-price shocks (1973-1974 and 1979-1981) , as far as inflation is concerned, the historical record suggests that monetary policy in Taiwan has been very successful. Figure 1 shows that during other periods the rate of inflation in Taiwan typically has been relatively low, nearly always being between 2%
and 7% per year.
But could the Central Bank of Taiwan have performed much better than it actually did?
That is, could it have achieved a lower and less variable rate of inflation at little or no cost in terms of lost output? Because Taiwanese monetary policy has been discretionary, rather than based on a formal rule, there is a strand of macroeconomic theory that suggests the answer to this question must be yes. If the structure of the Taiwanese economy is such that an unexpected increase in the rate of inflation causes output to increase, then policy makers have an incentive to increase inflation. This implies that a discretionary monetary policy will have an inflationary bias [Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro (1986) ]. The existence of this inflationary bias makes it difficult for policy makers to lower expected inflation without first earning a reputation for price stability. If the only way to earn this reputation is through actually achieving low inflation, then the cost of reducing inflation is a significant loss of output. A solution to this reputation or credibility problem is for the monetary authority to follow an explicit formal rule that eliminates its discretion to inflate. It therefore follows that a monetary policy implemented according to a rule will achieve lower inflation than a discretionary monetary policy. For example, Judd and Motley (1991 , 1992 , 1993 and McCallum (1988) have examined the empirical properties of nominal feedback rules and find that the use of simple feedback rules could have produced price stability for the United States over the past several decades without significantly increasing the volatility of real output. This paper examines whether the central bank of Taiwan would have had a more successful monetary policy if it had followed an explicit rule rather than the discretionary policies it actually implemented. Of the rules considered here, only one yields both an output variance and an inflation variance appreciably lower than those actually realized by the Taiwanese economy. Hence this paper concludes that the discretionary policies implemented by the central bank of Taiwan were very close to being optimal.
Svensson (1998) divides proposed rules for monetary policy into two broad groups, instrument rules and targeting rules. Instrument rules require that the central bank adjust its policy instrument in response to deviations between the actual and desired value of one or more variables being targeted by the monetary authority. Examples of this type of rule are those proposed by both Taylor (1993) and McCallum (1988) . A rule that requires the Fed to raise the federal funds rate (its instrument of monetary policy) whenever the growth rate of nominal GDP is unexpectedly high (the rate of growth of nominal GDP being the target variable) regardless of other information available to the Fed is an example of an instrument rule.
But because instrument rules do not use all information available to the monetary authority, as shown by both Friedman (1975) and Svensson (1998) , they are inferior to monetary policy rules that do use all available information. If a monetary policy rule minimizes a specified loss function while allowing the monetary authority to use all available information, then Svensson (1998) calls it a targeting rule. If the monetary authority is following a targeting rule, then it will respond to all information in a manner that minimizes its loss function. The loss function formalizes how important the monetary authority believes are deviations of its various target variables from their optimal values. The policy rule is derived from the optimal solution of the dynamic programming problem that minimizes the loss function subject to the structure of the economy. The resulting rule expresses the growth of the policy instrument as a function of the predetermined variables in the model. That is, the policy instrument responds not only to the target variables but also to all other variables in the model. Hence a targeting rule would not always require the Fed to raise the federal funds rate when the growth rate of nominal GDP is unexpectedly high because other information might imply that the relatively high rate of growth of nominal GDP is the result of an increase in the growth rate of real GDP (rather than an increase in inflation).
Although there appears to be a growing consensus that price stability should be the central long-run objective of monetary policy, there are still continuing debates about the proper selection of the policy instrument and the best target variables. But clearly the choice of the best policy instrument and the best target(s) is an empirical issue. Furthermore, the best choices can vary from country to country because the controllability of any particular policy instrument and the effectiveness of each target most likely vary across countries. Therefore, this paper examines two different policy instruments and several targets to search for the best policy rule for Taiwan.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the instrument and the targets of monetary policy that this paper considers. Section 3 describes the method used to derive the policy rules and conduct the simulations. Section 4 describes the data and presents the simulation results, while Section 5 offers some conclusions.
Instruments and Targets of Monetary Policies
In discussing how monetary policy should be implemented it is helpful to draw a distinction between the instruments and the targets of monetary policy. The targets of monetary policy are those macroeconomic variables that the monetary authority ultimately desires to influence through its policy actions [Friedman, 1975] . For this reason Svensson (1998) [Kohn (1994) ]. This paper presents simulation results using both types of instruments. The results support the central bank of Taiwan's decision to use an interest rate instrument. This paper examines four target variables: a monetary aggregate, the exchange rate, nominal income and the rate of inflation. The targeting of a monetary aggregate often is advocated by those who believe that business cycles largely result from changes in the growth rate of a monetary aggregate [Warburton (1966) , M. Friedman (1960) ]. Another reason for choosing a monetary aggregate as the target variable for monetary policy is its ability to serve as a nominal anchor that can prevent policies from allowing inflation to increase to an unacceptable level. Although this allows a monetary aggregate to communicate long-run policy objectives to the general public, as Friedman (1975) points out, it is by its very nature an inferior choice as a target variable because the monetary authority is only concerned with monetary aggregates to the extent that it provides them with information about inflation and output growth. For a more complete discussion about different target variables, see Mishkin (1999 Friedman (1975) shows that the use of intermediate targets is not optimal. Although Svensson's (1998) idea of using forecasts of the target variable as a synthetic intermediate target is implicit in Friedman's (1975) 
instability in the velocity of money for the time being has ended any possibility that a monetary aggregate will be used as a target for monetary policy in the United States. McKinnon (1984) and Williamson and Miller (1987) argue that monetary policy should target the exchange rate in an open economy. For example, the exchange rate has been the sole or main target in most of the EMS countries. Pegging the domestic currency to a strong currency prevents changes in the exchange rate from having an effect on the domestic price level. But exchange rate targeting results in the loss of an independent monetary policy. The targeting country cannot respond to domestic shocks that are independent of those hitting the anchor country because exchange rate targeting requires that its interest rate be closely linked to that in the anchor country.
McCallum (1988) suggests a nominal GDP targeting rule because of its close relationship
with the price level. The nominal GDP target has intrinsic appeal when instability in velocity makes a monetary target unreliable. As long as the growth rate of real GDP is predictable, there is a predictable relationship between nominal GDP and the price level. However, recent studies on the time series properties of real GDP raise questions about the predictability of real GDP. If real GDP does not grow at a constant rate, then a constant growth rate for nominal GDP does not guarantee a stable price level.
Recently there has been a great upsurge of interest in direct inflation targeting, a policy that has been adopted by the central banks of New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Australia, and Spain. Although this policy has been implemented with apparent success in the above countries, there are theoretical concerns with inflation targeting. One problem with inflation targeting is that the effect of monetary policy actions on the price level occurs with considerably more delay than its effects on financial variables. The use of a financial variable such as monetary aggregates or exchange rates as the target would provide an earlier signal to the public that policy has deviated from its goals. In addition, attempts by the central banks to achieve a predetermined path for prices may cause large movements in real GDP, but only if the price level is sticky in the short run.
But the apparent success of inflation targeting, where it has been tried, suggests that these concerns are misplaced. A careful reading of Friedman (1975) and Svensson (1998) also suggests that these concerns are misplaced.
Although, as noted above, by their very nature targeting rules are superior to instrument rules. Hence this paper emphasizes targeting rules. But just how much better targeting rules are than instrument rules is an empirical question of some practical importance because instrument rules are more transparent than targeting rules. Hence, for completeness, this paper also presents results for instrument rules using the rate of interest and the monetary base as instruments and the rate of inflation as the target variable.
The Model and Methodology

The instrument rule
An instrument rule adjusts the growth of the policy instrument in response to deviations between the actual and desired value of the target variable. That is,
where I t represents the policy instrument, ∆x t is the target variable, the superscript * denotes the target value desired by the central bank, and λ defines the proportion of a target miss to which the central bank chooses to respond. In this paper, variables are expressed as deviations from their own means. Therefore, there is no cost in terms of generality to set the targeted growth rate desired by the central bank to zero.
The economy is characterized by an open-economy VARX model which includes five variables: the growth rate 4 of real income (∆y t ), the rate of inflation (∆p t ), the change in the logarithm of the exchange rate (∆e t ), the growth rate of the monetary base (∆m t ), and the change in the interest rate (∆r t ). Since the purpose of this paper only requires a model that fits the Taiwanese economy well during the sample period, we use a general VARX model with a 4
Growth rates in the empirical work are calculated by taking log-first differences.
maximum lag length of four and adopt Hsiao's (1981) method to determine the optimal lags for each variable.
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Specifically, the general VARX model can be written as:
where ∆X t is the 4×1 vector that contains variables other than the growth of the policy instrument.
The policy instrument has immediate effects on other variables if the 4×1 vector a 0 is not zero.
For example, if the instrument is r t and the target is ∆p t , then X t = [ y t , p t , e t , m t ] and equations (1) and (2) can be written as:
'
Previous studies such as Judd and Motley (1991 , 1992 , 1993 and McCallum (1988) estimate equation (2) and assume that the economy faces the same set of shocks that actually occurred in the sample period. The estimated equation, the historical shocks, and the policy rule
(1) are used to generate the counterfactual data. Statistics calculated from the counterfactual data are then compared to the historical experiences. In these studies, the response parameter λ is arbitrarily set and the results from different λ's are compared.
However, given linearity of the model and the variance-covariance matrix of historical shocks, one can analytically solve for the value of λ that minimizes the variance of the inflation rates. Specifically, substituting (1) into (2) yields a VAR(5) in ∆X t . For convenience, the VAR (5) system can be written as a more compact expression: 5 We tried to adopt Ball's (1998) open-economy Keynesian type model to Taiwan, but this model was not supported by the Taiwanese data.
where W t = [ X t , X t-1 , X t-2 , X t-3 , X t-4 ] and ν ν ν ν t = [ε ε ε ε t , 0] are both 20×1. Assume that ∆W t is stationary.
Denote V ∆W as the variance-covariance matrix of ∆W t and V ν ν ν ν the variance-covariance matrix of ν ν ν ν t . Equation (3) implies
Given the regression results of (2), the variance of ∆p t is a function of λ only. Therefore, the value of λ that minimizes the variance of ∆p t , given historical shocks, can be calculated.
The advantages of an instrument rule include its simplicity, transparency to the public, and the fact that it is always operational. The central bank responds to observed deviations from the target and does not need to base its policy actions on forecasts that require knowledge of the structure of the economy. However, as noted above, instrument rules are not optimal in the sense that they do not use all available information. The policy instrument only responds to the target variables, which is usually inefficient compared to rules that allow the instrument to respond to all the variables in the model. The following section uses an optimal control problem to derive the optimal policy rule, instead of specifying the rule in advance.
The targeting rule
A targeting rule is derived from the minimization of a loss function. This loss function reflects the policymaker's desired path for the target variable. A commonly used one is a quadratic loss function which penalizes deviations of the target variable from its target value.
The policymaker's optimization problem can be solved with the knowledge of the dynamics of the economic structure, which is equation (2). That is, equation (2) is used as the constraints in the dynamic programming problem.
To simplify analysis, equation (2) is written as a first-order system,
where
20×20, C is 20×1, η η η η t is 20×1, and their arguments should be obvious. Therefore, the central bank's control problem is to minimize a stream of expected quadratic loss function:
subject to
where the expectation E 0 is conditional on the initial condition Z 0 . Again, without loss of generality, the target value is set to zero since all the variables are expressed as deviations from Now the problem is to choose the policy instrument ∆I 1 , . . ., ∆I T that minimizes (6),
given the initial condition Z 0 . By using Bellman's (1957) method of dynamic programming the problem is solved backward. That is, the last period T is solved first, given the initial condition Z T-1 . Having found the optimal I T , we solve the two-period problem for the last two periods by choosing the optimal I T-1 , contingent on the initial condition Z T-2 , and so on.
Letting T → ∞ , the optimal policy rule can be expressed as [see Chow (1975, ch. 8 ) for
derivation details]:
with H = K + (B+CG) ' H (B+CG), and
The rule defines the policy instrument as a function of the predetermined variables in the model.
The economy is assumed to face the same set of shocks that actually occurred in the historical period. Therefore, the estimated equations, the policy rule, and the historical shocks are used to generate the counterfactual data. The resulting statistics are compared.
Even though it is usually more efficient to let the instrument respond to all the relevant variables than to let it respond only to the target variables, the ad hoc instrument rules are more widely discussed in the literature. The reason for the preference for simple instrument rules may be that the targeting rule is more sensitive to model specifications. For example, the assumption of full information is generally maintained for the computation of an optimal rule. This tends to make the targeting rule less robust to model specification errors than are the simple instrument rules. In addition, the optimal rule may require larger adjustments of the instrument because it responds to more variables. This would in turn yield undesired higher volatility of the other variables such as output growth. Therefore, again, the choice between the instrument rule and the targeting rule cannot be determined by theory alone and is an empirical issue.
Empirical Results
Data
This paper uses Taiwanese 
Estimation results under instrument rules
Panel A in Table 1 The simulations using an interest rate instrument yielded standard deviations for output growth, the change in the exchange rate, and money growth that are only slightly higher than those for the historical data, while the standard deviation of inflation is slightly lower than its historical value. The only standard deviation in the first row of Panel A that differs substantially from the historical data is that for the change in the interest rate, which is much lower in the simulation. These results indicate that actual policy in Taiwan exception that the optimal rule would have yielded a more stable rate of interest.
The simulation using the monetary base as the instrument yielded slightly higher standard deviations for all variables except the rate of inflation. Those for output growth, the change in the exchange rate, and the rate of interest were only slightly higher than the historical values, while the standard deviation of the growth rate of the monetary base was much higher than its historical value. The standard deviation of the inflation rate is slightly lower than the historical value but is higher than that in the interest rate instrument rule. These results suggest that the discretionary policy implemented in Taiwan was superior to an optimal monetary base instrument rule. They also indicate that an instrument rule using the rate of interest would have been superior to one employing the monetary base as instrument, though not by a large margin.
Estimation results under targeting rules
Panel B of 
Conclusion
Taiwan has been very successful in using discretionary monetary policies. This paper attempts to see whether there exist policy rules that can improve the Taiwanese economy for the past several decades. This paper evaluates several monetary policy rules using Taiwanese quarterly data from 1971:1 to 1997:4.
Two types of policy rules are examined. Instrument rules adjust the growth of the policy instrument in response to deviations between the actual and desired values of the target variable.
Unlike those in the previous studies where arbitrary instrument rules are proposed, this paper solves analytically for the optimal instrument rules that minimize the standard deviation of the rate of inflation.
Targeting rules are derived from the solution to the dynamic programming problem that minimizes a loss function subject to the structure of the economy. The rule expresses the growth of the policy instrument as a function of all the predetermined variables in the model.
Two policy instruments (interest rate and monetary base) and four targets variables (nominal GDP growth, inflation rate, changes in exchange rates, and money growth rate) are examined in the paper. Simulations of a simple VARX model and the policy rules suggest that, compared to the historical policy, the use of a policy rule in Taiwan would not have reduced substantially the volatility of inflation rate. The only policy rule that would appeal to the authority is the direct inflation targeting rule with the interest rate as the instrument. This rule would have reduced the standard deviation of the inflation rate in Taiwan by 0.7% while maintained similar volatility of the other variables to those in the historical data. 
